The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy and the Way Out of Afghanistan, by Bing West (Random House, $28, 307 pp HB, 2011) Striking front book cover!
I couldn't put it down.
But what is the "wrong war"? And, why? Are we truly always fighting the last war?
I know the name, Bing West, from somewhere but can't put my finger on where. He was a colonel in the Marines and perhaps wrote for Army Times (or Marine Corps Times or Air Force Times or Navy Times - they are all related), is an author of several highly acclaimed military books and served as Assistant Sec Dev (for International Security Affairs) after serving in combat in Viet Nam.
All that said, this should be a required text book at West Point and Annapolis (for future Marine leaders). West does an excellent job of telling it like it is for infantry troops in a "hot" northeastern province of Afghanistan (Konar) for half the book, then relating a difficult situation in Helmand province, down south in Pashtun* country. However, by the time you get to the "Helmand half," you may be as tired as I was hearing about patrols and small unit fighting. Even me who knows the place names and history, having spent a tour in southern Afghanistan a year prior to the times West depicts (2007-08 while West's Marines fought in Helmand primarily beginning in 2009 [the book was written in 2011]).
Who are the Players?
West describes the problem with exquisite explaining (the solution, not so well, but he does list the solution components) - all the different sides: farmers and villagers and insurgents and informants and mullahs and elders, corrupt Afghan police, corrupt Afghan soldiers, corrupt Afghan politicians (yes, even President Karzai is described in less than positive terms). the Taliban, US forces. "Demanding money and resources was a habit. The military was the cleanest Afghan institution, yet each rank took from those below them. Uniform standards, particularly in selecting leaders, were lacking . . . . The system lacked a uniform set of rewards and penalties. The Afghan security system paid low wages, . . . . There was no incentive to run risks today in order to be rewarded later. Some incompetent officers were promoted due to tribal connections or payoffs, while others were selected based on proven courage and leadership. In contrast, the Taliban relieved leaders who performed poorly, . . . ." (p. 163)
And What About the Future? Is There an Entitlement Culture There?
Is counterinsurgency composed of "clear, hold, and build"? Should the US military be in the business of nation-building? Is materialism the unifying principle of a liberal counterinsurgency practice? (p. 242)
Love the Photos!
Primarily taken by the author (not a professional), the photos depict (and are called out in the text) life and combat in Afghanistan. However, three to a page makes them not quite as impressive as I would like.
Writing Style
Author West brings you along for the ride, as he was embedded with troops over three years. He also includes, as appendices, General Petraeus' COIN** guidance of August 2010 and his own to-do list of counterinsurgency lessons as well as points from his final fact-finding trip. Definitely food for thought as higher-ups compare and contrast VietNam and Afghanistan.
West acknowledges the people who helped him make this book possible and names more than 16 columns of them, mostly Soldiers and Marines. What a tribute!
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Other tidbits:
Korengal is mentioned, as is Restrepo, the film. Greg Mortenson's Three Cups of Tea is explained on page 110. Also COP Keating in Nuristan.
Nation building features these tasks: 1. protect the population, 2. give money and projects to stimulate patriotism, and 3. link the population with competent government officials. (p. 249)
Defeating an insurgency requires three tasks: 1. we cannot defeat the Taliban. They are too elusive and have a vast sanctuary. 2. we don't have the time to build a nation when its top leaders are feckless. 3. training and instilling confidence in the Afghan forces should be the first priority at this juncture. This war turns on whether the Afghan forces show they can beat the Taliban. Only then will the Pashtun khans begin to cooperate. (p. 289, West's observations)
What role did sanctuary play - not only UBL but also Pakistan? Geography? History of the tribes?
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*The Pashtuns are the major tribe in Afghanistan and the "birthplace" of the Taliban is said to be Kandahar, a province next to Helmand in the south. President Karzai is a Pashtun.
** Counterinsurgency
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